What caused the U.S. economy's shift from the Great In ‡ation era to the Great Moderation era? A large literature shows that the shift was achieved by the change in monetary policy from a passive to an active response to in ‡ation. However, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) attribute the shift to a fall in trend in ‡ation along with the policy change, based on a solely estimated Taylor rule and a calibrated staggered-price model. We estimate the Taylor rule and the staggered-price model jointly and demonstrate that the change in monetary policy responses to in ‡ation and other variables su¢ ces for explaining the shift. JEL Classi…cation: C11; E31; E52
Introduction
What caused the shift from the Great In ‡ation era to the Great Moderation era in the U.S. economy? Since the seminal work by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) , a large body of literature has regarded the Great In ‡ation era as a consequence of indeterminate equilibrium, which lasted until determinacy was restored in the Great Moderation era. 1 This literature has established the view that the U.S. economy's shift from indeterminacy to determinacy was achieved by the change in the Fed's policy from a passive to an active response to in ‡ation.
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler demonstrate this view by estimating a monetary policy rule of the sort proposed by Taylor (1993) and combining it with a calibrated sticky-price model to analyze determinacy. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) reach the same conclusion as Clarida, Galí, and Gertler using a distinct method. They estimate a Taylor rule and a sticky-price model jointly using a Bayesian likelihood approach that allows for indeterminacy. 2 The recent paper of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) challenges this view by arguing that the U.S. economy's shift from indeterminacy in the Great In ‡ation era to determinacy in the Great Moderation era was largely caused by a fall in trend in ‡ation along with the increase in the Fed's policy response to in ‡ation. According to recent studies, such as Ascari and Ropele (2009), Hornstein and Wolman (2005) , and Kiley (2007) , higher trend in ‡ation makes equilibrium more susceptible to indeterminacy in staggered-price models where each period a fraction of prices is kept unchanged on the basis of micro evidence on price adjustment. 3 Particularly, to guarantee determinacy in such models, higher trend 1 Our paper follows Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) to focus on the explanation of the Great In ‡ation era from the perspective of monetary policy. Other explanations emphasize relatively high volatility of shocks to the U.S. economy (e.g., Sims and Zha, 2006; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008) or the absence of inventory management that emerged in the Great Moderation era (e.g., Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quirós, 2002). in ‡ation calls for a stronger monetary policy response to in ‡ation, and for moderate-to-high trend in ‡ation, such a policy response must be more aggressive than that suggested by the Taylor principle, which claims that the nominal interest rate should be raised by more than the increase in in ‡ation. In light of this …nding, Coibion and Gorodnichenko estimate a Taylor rule-where the federal funds rate responds to its past rates, expected in ‡ation, the output gap, and output growth-during a period before 1979 and a period after 1982, and then combine it with a calibrated staggered-price model with trend in ‡ation to conduct a counterfactual experiment on the Taylor rule's responses and trend in ‡ation for the two periods. According to their experiment, the U.S. economy was likely in the indeterminacy region of the parameter space before 1979, whereas after 1982 the economy was likely in the determinacy region, in line with the results of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . However, Coibion and Gorodnichenko argue that the change in the Taylor rule's responses from their pre-1979 estimates to the post-1982 ones alone is not su¢ cient to rule out indeterminacy, unless trend in ‡ation falls from their calibrated level for the pre-1979 period to that for the post-1982 period.
This paper re-examines the role of trend in ‡ation in the U.S. economy's shift from indeterminacy in the Great In ‡ation era to determinacy in the Great Moderation era. Speci…cally, our paper employs the method of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) to jointly estimate the Taylor rule and the staggered-price model with trend in ‡ation during a period before 1979 and a period after 1982, allowing for indeterminacy. 4 Our approach with full-information likelihood-based estimation of the whole model complements the limited-information estimation of the Taylor rule by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) , as the approach of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) complements that of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) . The full-information likelihood-based estimation optimally adjusts estimates of the Taylor rule's responses for the endogeneity of its targeted variables. Moreover, because cross-equation restrictions that link the Taylor rule and decision rules of other agents in the model are exploited, it is possible to simultaneously identify other model parameters that characterize equilibrium determinacy, including the level of trend in ‡ation. 5 Our estimation results show that the change in the Taylor rule's responses to all the targeted variables from the pre-1979 to the post-1982 estimates alone su¢ ces for explaining the U.S. economy's shift from indeterminacy to determinacy, regardless of the estimated decline in trend in ‡ation. That is, the switch of the policy responses not only to in ‡ation but also to the other targeted variables-in particular, the output gap and output growth-played an essential role in the shift. This …nding extends the literature's view on the U.S. economy's shift from the Great In ‡ation era to the Great Moderation era by emphasizing the importance of the change in monetary policy responses to the targeted variables other than in ‡ation.
As Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) point out, a decrease in the policy response to the output gap and an increase in the policy response to output growth, as well as a rise in the policy response to in ‡ation, all made determinacy more likely in the Great Moderation era.
Our …nding contrasts starkly with the argument of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) .
Among several di¤erences between their paper and ours, what is crucial lies in the treatment of the level of trend in ‡ation in the pre-1979 and post-1982 periods. Our full-information estimation of the whole model can identify the trend in ‡ation level, whereas their limitedinformation estimation of the Taylor rule cannot, and thus they calibrate it. 6 Our estimates of trend in ‡ation in the two periods are in line with those of Cogley and Sbordone (2008) , while the calibrated values of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) are higher than our estimates.
Such higher calibrated values greatly increase the e¤ect of the decline in trend in ‡ation on the shift from indeterminacy to determinacy, since higher trend in ‡ation makes equilibrium more susceptible to indeterminacy in the model. 7 5 For the approach of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) that conducts a limited-information estimation of a Taylor rule, Mavroeidis (2010) points to limitations of their approach and emphasizes the need to make use of identifying assumptions that can be derived from the full structure of their model. 6 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) estimate a constant term of the Taylor rule, which contains not only trend in ‡ation but also other factors. Consequently, the level of trend in ‡ation is not identi…able. This section presents the log-linearized model for estimation. Details of the model are described in Appendix.
The log-linearized model for estimation
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions are given bŷ
that the fall in trend in ‡ation from the level calibrated for the Great In ‡ation era to that for the Great Moderation era played a crucial role in the U.S. economy's shift from indeterminacy to determinacy, which is in sharp contrast with our …nding.
x t =ŷ t ŷ n t ;
where hatted variables denote log-deviations from steady-state or trend levels.
Eq. (1) is a spending Euler equation, whereŷ t is (detrended) output,r t is the monetary policy rate,^ t is in ‡ation, z u;t is a preference shock, z a;t is a (non-stationary) technology
shock, E t is the rational-expectations operator conditional on information available in period t, h 2 [0; 1] represents the degree of habit persistence in consumption preferences, and a is the steady-state gross rate of technological change, which equals the steady-state gross rate of balanced growth. Eq. (2) is a generalized New Keynesian Phillips curve, where t is an (endogenous) auxiliary variable, 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, 2 [0; 1) is the probability of no price adjustment, is the gross rate of steady-state or trend in ‡ation, > 1 is the price elasticity of demand, and 0 is the elasticity of labor supply. Eq. (3) describes the dynamics of the auxiliary variable t . Note that Eq. (2) indeed generalizes the New Keynesian Phillips curve because it can be reduced tô
when the trend in ‡ation rate is zero (i.e., = 1), which implies t = 0 in Eq. (3), and there is no habit persistence (i.e., h = 0). Eq. (4) is a Taylor rule that adjusts the policy rater t in response to the past ratesr t 1 ;r t 2 , the expected in ‡ation rate E t^ t+1 , the output gap x t , and the output growth rateŷ t ŷ t 1 + z a;t , where r1 ; r2 ; ; x ; y are the degrees of monetary policy responses to these targeted variables and z r;t is a monetary policy shock.
Eq. (5) is the de…nition of the output gapx t , whileŷ n t denotes the natural rate of output (the output that could be obtained if prices were ‡exible, that is, = 0) and its law of motion is given by Eq. (6) . Note that a steady-state condition determines the subjective discount factor as = a=r, where r is the steady-state gross policy rate.
Each of the three shocks z i;t , i 2 fu; a; rg is assumed to follow the stationary …rst-order autoregressive process
where i 2 [0; 1) is the autoregressive parameter and " i;t i.i.d. N (0; 2 i ) is the innovation to each shock.
The Econometric Strategy and Data
This section describes our strategy and data for estimating the log-linearized model presented in the preceding section. Previous studies, such as Ascari and Ropele (2009), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), Kurozumi (2014) , and Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2016a), show that higher trend in ‡ation makes equilibrium more susceptible to indeterminacy in Calvo staggered-price models where each period a fraction of prices is kept unchanged. Our paper thus follows Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) to construct a likelihood function of the model for the indeterminacy region of the parameter space as well as the determinacy region. 8 This section …rst explains our method for solving linear rational-expectations (LRE) models under equilibrium indeterminacy and then presents our Bayesian method for estimating the model presented above, in addition to data used in estimation. Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) show a full set of solutions to LRE models by extending the solution algorithm developed by Sims (2002) . 9 Any LRE model can be written in the canonical form
Rational-expectations solutions under indeterminacy
where 0 (#), 1 (#), (#), and (#) are conformable matrices of coe¢ cients that depend on structural parameters #, s t is a vector of endogenous variables including those expected at time t, " t is a vector of fundamental shocks, and t is a vector of forecast errors. Speci…cally, in our model, these vectors are given by
According to Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) , a full set of solutions to the LRE model (8) is of the form
where x (#), " (#;M ), and (#) are coe¢ cient matrices,M is an arbitrary matrix, and t is a reduced-form sunspot shock, which is a non-fundamental disturbance. 10 For estimation, it is assumed that t i.i.d. N (0; 2 ). When equilibrium is determinate, the solution (9) is reduced to
The solution (9) possesses two important features under indeterminacy. First, the equilibrium dynamics is driven not only by the fundamental shocks " t but also by the sunspot 9 Sims (2002) generalizes the solution algorithm of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and characterizes one particular solution-which is called the "orthogonality solution"-in case of equilibrium indeterminacy. In this solution, the contribution of fundamental shocks and sunspot shocks to forecast errors is orthogonal. 10 Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) originally express the last term in (9) as ( ; M ) t , where M is an arbitrary matrix and t is a vector of sunspot shocks. For identi…cation, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) impose the normalization M = 1 with the dimension of the sunspot shock vector being unity. Such a normalized shock is referred to as a "reduced-form sunspot shock"in that it contains beliefs associated with all the expectational variables.
shock t . Second, the equilibrium representation cannot be unique due to the presence of the arbitrary matrixM , that is, the model induces indeterminate solutions. Therefore, to specify the law of motion of the endogenous variables s t , the matrixM must be pinned down.
This paper infers the matrixM from the data, following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) .
In their approach,M is replaced with M (#) + M , where M (#) is selected so that equilibrium responses of the endogenous variables s t to the fundamental shocks " t are continuous at the boundary between determinacy and indeterminacy regions of the parameter space, and where M is estimated with prior mean zero. 11 While Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) analytically calculate the matrix M (#) for a prototypical sticky-price model, the present paper numerically computes it for our model.
Bayesian inference
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods for both determinacy and indeterminacy regions of the parameter space. 
Prior distributions
Although the elasticity of labor supply is …xed at = 1 to avoid an identi…cation issue, all of the other parameters are estimated. The prior distributions of parameters to be estimated are shown in Table 1 . For the spending habit persistence h and the probability of no price adjustment , the priors are set to be beta distributions with mean of 0:5. The prior of the price elasticity of demand is chosen to be a gamma distribution with mean of 10, which is the same as the value calibrated by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) . For the monetary policy responses to in ‡ation and the output gap ; x , our paper follows Smets According to these prior distributions, the prior probability of determinacy of equilibrium in the model is almost even, i.e., 0:493, which suggests that there is a priori no substantial bias toward determinacy or indeterminacy. As for the other structural parameters (i.e., h, , , a, r), their 90 percent credible intervals overlap between the pre-1979 and post-1982 periods, indicating that these parameters do not change signi…cantly between the two periods. 16 The next subsection thus focuses on the changes in the monetary policy responses and trend in ‡ation to investigate sources of the shift from indeterminacy of equilibrium in the pre-1979 period to determinacy in the post-1982 period. 
Results of Empirical Analysis

Sources of the shift from the Great In ‡ation era to the Great
Moderation era
Conclusion
A.1 The household
The representative household consumes …nal goodsC t , supplies labor fl t (i)g speci…c to each intermediate-good …rm i 2 [0; 1], and purchases one-period riskless bonds B t so as to maximize the utility function
where E t is the rational-expectations operator conditional on information available in period t, 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, h 2 [0; 1] represents the degree of (external) habit persistence in consumption preferences, 0 is the elasticity of labor supply, P t is the price of …nal goods, W t (i) is the real wage paid by intermediate-good …rm i, r t is the gross nominal interest rate on bonds, which is assumed to equal the monetary policy rate, T t consists of lump-sum public transfers and …rm pro…ts, and z u;t is a shock to the discount factor.
In the presence of complete insurance markets, the …rst-order conditions for utility maximization with respect to consumption, labor supply, and bond holdings become
where t is the marginal utility of consumption, C t is aggregate consumption, and t = P t =P t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate of …nal goods'price.
A.2 Firms
The representative …nal-good …rm produces homogeneous goods Y t by choosing a combination of di¤erentiated intermediate inputs fY t (i)g so as to maximize pro…t
subject to the CES production technology
where P t (i) is the price of intermediate good i and > 1 is the price elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.
The …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization yields the …nal-good …rm's demand for
Then, the CES production technology leads to
The …nal-good market clearing condition is given by
Each intermediate-good …rm i produces one kind of di¤erentiated goods Y t (i) under monopolistic competition. Firm i's production function is given by
where A t represents the technology level and follows the stochastic process
where a is the steady-state gross rate of technological change, which equals the steady-state gross rate of balanced growth, and z a;t is a (non-stationary) technology shock.
The …rst-order condition for …rm i's minimization of production cost yields its real marginal cost
In the face of the …nal-good …rm's demand (14) and the marginal cost (19) , intermediategood …rms set prices of their products on a staggered basis as in Calvo (1983) . In each period, a fraction 2 (0; 1) of …rms keeps previous-period prices unchanged, while the remaining fraction 1 of …rms sets the price P t (i) so as to maximize the pro…t function
where Q t;t+j is the stochastic discount factor between period t and period t + j. For this pro…t function to be well-de…ned, it is assumed that the two conditions 1 < 1 and
where is the gross rate of trend in ‡ation (i.e., the steady-state value of …nal goods'price in ‡ation rate), are satis…ed.
The …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization of intermediate-good …rms that reset prices in period t becomes 
where the insurance-market equilibrium condition Q t;t+j = j t+j = t is used and where p t = P t =P t , P t is the price reset by the …rms and mc t+j is their real marginal cost. From (11) , (12) , (14) , (16) , (17) , and (19) , it follows that the marginal cost is given by
Under the staggered pricing, the …nal-good price equation (15) can be written as
A.3 The central bank
The central bank conducts monetary policy according to a Taylor (1993)-type monetary policy rule. This rule adjusts the policy rate r t in response to the past rates r t 1 ; r t 2 , the deviations of the gross rates of expected in ‡ation E t t+1 and output growth Y t =Y t 1 from their trend levels and a, and the output gap x t :
log r t = r1 log r t 1 + r2 log r t 1 + (1 r1 r2 ) log r + (log E t t+1 log ) + x log x t + y log Y t Y t 1 log a + z r;t ; (23) where the output gap is de…ned as
Y n t is the natural rate of output; z r;t is a monetary policy shock; r is the steady-state gross policy rate; and r1 ; r2 ; ; x ; y are the degrees of monetary policy responses to the past policy rates, in ‡ation, the output gap, and output growth. By considering ‡exible prices (i.e., = 0) in the intermediate-good price equation (20) and the …nal-good price equation (22) and combining the resulting two equations with the marginal-cost equation (21), we have the law of motion for the natural rate of output
The equilibrium conditions are given by (11)-(13), (18) , (20)- (24) , and (25) . Combining these equilibrium conditions, rewriting the resulting equations in terms of the detrended variables y t = Y t =A t ; y n t = Y n t =A t , and log-linearizing them yields the log-linearized model consisting of (1)- (6) . Notes: The …gure shows the equilibrium determinacy region of the parameter space of the annualized trend in ‡ation rate 4 and the monetary policy response to in ‡ation . In each panel, the mark " ", " ", and " " respectively represent the pair of (4 pre79 ; pre79 ), (4 pre79 ; post82 ), and (4 post82 ; post82 ), where pre79 , pre79 , post82 , and post82 denote the posterior-mean estimates of the trend in ‡ation rate and the policy response to in ‡ation for the pre-1979 and post-1982 periods.
